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Foreword
Fraud’s economic effects are clear — private companies are 
less financially healthy and stable, the quality of public services 
is reduced, individual citizens have less disposable income 
and charities are deprived of resources needed for charitable 
purposes. In every sector in every country, fraud has a serious 
and detrimental impact on the quality of life. 
However, the last 15 to 20 years has seen the 
development of new tools to counter fraud. It used to be 
thought that the total cost of fraud could not be measured 
and therefore very hard to manage. That changed some 
time ago and this report documents the work that has 
taken place over the last 19 years, in many sectors and 
countries, to accurately measure the cost of fraud.
This report builds on research first undertaken and 
published in 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015 considering 
just what the financial cost of fraud really is. It is the 
output of the collaboration between Crowe Clark 
Whitehill and the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies at 
University of Portsmouth (CCFS), Europe’s premier fraud 
research centre.
Rapid changes have taken place in countering fraud over 
the last 15 to 20 years. The traditional approach was to 
hope that it wouldn’t happen and then to react when it 
did (after losses had been incurred) with an investigation 
followed sometimes by litigation or a prosecution.
Litigation or a prosecution can still be important 
but in 2017, only taking a reactive approach is old 
fashioned thinking.
In the UK, from the late 1990s, the Department of Work 
and Pensions and the NHS started to accurately measure 
fraud (and error) losses.
 1 European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption Declaration 2004
The European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption 
Declaration of 2004, agreed by organisations from 28 
countries, called for “the development of a European 
common standard of risk measurement, with annual 
statistically valid follow up exercises to measure 
progress in reducing losses to fraud and corruption 
throughout the EU1.”
In the United States, the Improper Payments Information 
Act of 2002 provided that public agencies should publish 
a “statistically valid estimate” of the extent of fraud 
and error in their programmes and activities. This was 
reinforced by the Improper Payments Elimination and 
Recovery Act of 2010. As a result, most major US public 
sector agencies have been measuring and reporting 
losses for more than a decade.
Many more exercises to measure losses have taken 
place than would otherwise be the case, and this report 
documents what has been found over the period from 
1997 to 2016. It also compares the cost of fraud between 
2014 to 2016 against the period prior to the global 
recession of 2008 to 2009.
Of course, there are still some estimates published which 
are not reliable for the purpose of estimating the total cost 
of fraud. Counting only those losses which are detected 
or prosecuted, or surveying those working in the area for 
their opinion, will never be accepted as a reliable indicator 
of the real economic cost of fraud. 
This report takes the debate much further forward.  
It shows that the financial cost of fraud and error can be 
accurately measured in the same way as other business 
costs. It demonstrates that this is not unnecessarily  
costly or difficult and most importantly, it shows what  
the financial cost is likely to be. 
The volume of data, the total value of the expenditure 
concerned, the number of different types of expenditure 
and the different organisations and countries concerned, 
are impressive. 
The evidence revealed in this report that these losses 
can be, and have been, reduced by up to 40% within 12 
months, provides a real business opportunity. Private 
companies can gain a competitive advantage if the 
cost of fraud is reduced; public expenditure reductions 
can be less painful; and the charity sector can increase 
the resources it has available to deliver on important 
charitable purposes.
Fraud is the last great unreduced business cost, and this 
report shows just how significant that cost is.
JIM GEE
Partner and Head of Forensic and Counter Fraud 
Services for Crowe Clark Whitehill LLP and Visiting 
Professor and Chair of the Centre for Counter Fraud 
Studies at University of Portsmouth.
“It will take a brave Chief Executive 
or Director of Finance of any  
organisation to argue that the  
impact of fraud on their organisation 
is less than what this report finds to 
be the case – more than two thirds 
of the exercises that were  
reviewed showed losses of more 
than 3% of expenditure, with the 
19 year average running at 5.85% 
and this figure rising by 28% 
since 2007”
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Introduction
1.1. This report renews research first undertaken in 
2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015, collating accurate, 
statistically valid information from around the 
world about the real financial cost of fraud and 
error. Once the extent of fraud losses is known 
then they can be treated like any other business 
cost – as something to be managed and minimised 
in the best interest of the financial health and 
stability of the organisation concerned. It becomes 
possible to go beyond reacting to unforeseen 
individual instances of fraud and to embed 
strategies to pre-empt and minimise fraud losses in 
business plans.
1.2. The report does not look at detected fraud or the 
individual cases which have come to light and 
been prosecuted in the report. This is because 
there is no crime which has a 100% detection rate, 
so adding together detected fraud significantly 
underestimates the problem. If detected fraud 
losses go up, does that mean that there is more 
fraud or that there has been better detection. 
Equally, if detected fraud losses fall, does that 
mean that there is less fraud or worse detection?
1.3. The report also does not rely on survey-based 
information where those involved are asked for 
their opinions about the level of fraud. These tend 
to vary significantly according to the perceived 
seriousness of the problem at the time by those 
surveyed. While such surveys sometimes represent 
a valid survey of opinion, that is very different from 
a valid estimate of losses.
1.4. Instead, this report considers and analyses 558 
exercises which have been undertaken around 
the world during the last 19 years, to accurately 
measure the financial cost resulting from fraud 
and error. 
1.5. That financial cost is surely the worst aspect of 
the problem. Yes, fraud is unethical, immoral and 
unlawful; yes, the individuals who are proven to 
have been involved should be punished; yes, 
the sums lost to fraud need to be traced and 
recovered. However, these are actions which take 
place after the fraud losses have happened – after 
the resources have been diverted from where they 
were intended and after the economic damage has 
occurred. 
1.6. In almost every other area of business life, 
organisations know what their costs are – staffing 
costs, accommodation costs, utility costs, 
procurement costs and many others. For centuries, 
these costs have been assessed and reviewed and 
measures have been developed to reduce them 
and improve efficiency. This process now often 
delivers quite small additional improvements.
1.7. Fraud and error costs, on the other hand, have only 
had the same focus over the last 15 to 20 years. 
The common position has been that organisations 
have either denied that they had any fraud or 
planned only to react after fraud has taken place. 
Because of this, fraud is now one of the great 
unreduced business costs.
1.8. Now that the total cost of fraud can be measured, it 
can be managed and reduced using a methodology 
to do this accurately, which has been widely 
applied across many sectors and countries.
1.9. Because it is now possible to measure fraud and 
error losses, proper judgements can be taken 
about a proportionate level of investment to be 
made in reducing them. Re-measurement can then 
assess the financial benefits resulting from their 
reduction.
1.10. Making organisations more efficient and reducing 
costs is an ever-present task. Fraud is an 
unnecessary cost because much of it can be 
pre-empted. This report identifies what the financial 
cost of fraud and error has been found to be and 
the ‘size of the prize’ to be achieved from reducing 
that cost.
1.11. There is always more research to be done and 
any organisation should consider what its own 
fraud and error costs are likely to be. However, 
the volume of data which is already available 
from exercises covering total expenditure of over 
£13.27 trillion (sterling equivalent) points clearly 
to losses usually being found in the range of 
3-10%, probably around the average of 5.85% and 
possibly much higher.
1.12. We will continue to monitor data as it becomes 
available and publish further reports as appropriate.
2. Overview
2.1. Our research has now reviewed 558 loss 
measurement exercises undertaken over the period 
from 1997 to 2016. The exercises took place 
across 40 different types of expenditure, in 48 
organisations from 10 countries considering losses 
in expenditure with a total value of £13.27 trillion. 
The value of the expenditure examined has not 
been uprated to 2016 values. The losses referred to 
are a percentage loss of expenditure.
2.2. This report is based on extensive global 
research, building on previously established 
direct knowledge, to collate information about 
relevant exercises. The data was then analysed 
electronically. Exercises were collated from Europe, 
North America, Australasia and Africa. None were 
found in Asia. 
2.3. Guesstimates, figures derived from detected 
fraud losses, and figures resulting from surveys 
of opinion have been excluded from the report. 
It has also excluded some loss measurement 
exercises where it is clear that they have not met 
the standards described below.
2.4. It has included exercises which:
 • have considered a statistically valid sample of 
income or expenditure
 • have sought and examined information indicating 
the presence of fraud, error or correctness in 
each case within that sample
 • have been completed and reported
 • have been externally validated
 • have a measurable level of statistical confidence
 • have a measurable level of accuracy.
2.5. A number of caveats have been outlined.
 • Some of the exercises have resulted in estimates 
of the fraud frequency rate and some of the 
percentage of expenditure lost to fraud. Some 
have measured both.
 • It is also the case that some exercises have 
separately identified and measured fraud and 
error, and some have not. 
 • Sometimes, such exercises have been 
completed, the organisations concerned have, 
mistakenly in the view of the authors of this 
report, decided not to publish their results. 
Transparency about the scale of the problem is a 
key factor in its solution, because attention can 
be focused and a proportionate investment made 
to address the issue.
 • In some cases, those directly involved in 
countering fraud have decided, confidentially, to 
provide information about unpublished exercises 
for wider consideration. In those cases, while the 
overall figures have been included in the findings 
of this report, no specific reference has been 
made to the organisations concerned.
 • The authors are also aware of a very small 
number of other exercises which have been 
completed, but which have not been published 
and where nothing is known of the findings. 
 • Finally, it is important to emphasise that this 
research will never be complete. More evidence 
becomes available each year. However, the 
preponderance of the evidence does point clearly 
in one direction, as is explained later.
 • While it is necessary to make these caveats 
clear, the importance of the evidence collated 
in this report should not be underestimated. It 
shows that losses to fraud and error represent a 
significant, damaging and, crucially, unnecessary 
business cost.
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2 Appendix C to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123
3 European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption Declaration 2004
3. Data from around the world 
3.1. The 10 countries in which the authors are aware 
that fraud loss analysis exercises have taken 
place are:
 • United Kingdom
 • United States of America
 • France
 • Belgium
 • The Netherlands
 • Ireland
 • Canada
 • Australia
 • New Zealand
 • Zambia.
3.2. By value of income or expenditure measured, the 
US has undertaken the greatest amount of work in 
this area. This is a direct reflection of the Improper 
Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), which 
requires designated major US public authorities 
to estimate the annual amount of payments made 
where fraud and error are present, and to report 
the estimates to the President and Congress with 
a progress report on actions to reduce them. The 
Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act 
of 2010 further strengthened this requirement.
3.3. The guidance relating to the original IPIA stated: 
“The estimates shall be based on the equivalent 
of a statistical random sample with a precision 
requiring a sample of sufficient size to yield an 
estimate with a 90% confidence interval of plus 
or minus 2.5%2.” This remains the case, although 
many US agencies undertake work to the higher 
standard often found in the UK and Europe – 95% 
statistical confidence and +/- 1%.
3.4. In other countries, while there has not yet been any 
legal requirement, there is a growing understanding 
that the key to successful loss reduction is to 
understand the nature and scale of the problem. 
For example, in Europe, the European Healthcare 
Fraud and Corruption Declaration, agreed by 
organisations from 28 countries called for “the 
development of a European common standard 
of risk measurement, with annual statistically 
valid follow up exercises to measure progress in 
reducing losses to fraud and corruption throughout 
the EU3.” 
3.5. In the UK, the government is on record as requiring 
this work to be undertaken. Indeed in late 2014, 
the government’s Cabinet Office Fraud Error and 
Debt Taskforce, with the agreement of Ministers, 
asked all government departments to undertake 
random sampling loss measurement exercises, and 
this work has proceeded rapidly since then. This 
is a major step forward to countering fraud in UK 
central government. 
3.6. These developments are part of a consistent 
trend. Over the period considered by this report 
(1997 to 2016), the growth in the number of loss 
measurement exercises is marked with a tenfold 
increase in prevalence.
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4. Types of income and 
expenditure and the nature of 
the figures
4.1. The types of income and expenditure where losses 
have been measured include:
 • payroll
 • procurement
 • housing
 • education
 • social security
 • healthcare
 • insurance
 • tax credits
 • pensions
 • agriculture
 • construction
 • compensation
 • mining.
4.2. The key figures which have been produced 
concern the Percentage Loss Rate (PLR  — i.e. the 
proportion of expenditure lost to fraud and error).
4.3. There is more research still to be done and it is 
intended that this report will be updated on a 
regular basis.
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5. Fraud and error losses
5.1. The range of percentage losses across all the 
exercises reviewed between 1997 and 2016 was 
found to be between 0.02% and 27.15%, with 
average losses of 5.85% (68% of the exercises 
showed loss figures of more than 3%).
5.2. Since the start of the global recession in 2008, 
there has been an increase in average losses from 
4.57% to 6.54% for the period 2014 to 2016 – an 
increase of 43%. 
5.3. The reasons for these increases, whether over 
the last two years or over the longer period since 
2007, seem to go beyond the economic cycle. 
Previous research has suggested some evidence 
that certain frauds increase during recessions 
and plateau or decrease slightly during periods of 
economic growth4.
5.4. This does not explain why the cost of fraud has 
continued to increase since economies have 
returned to growth. Further research will be 
needed but it may be that longer term social and 
technological factors are an underlying cause of 
the growth of fraud, in addition to the effect of the 
economic cycle.
5.5. Such factors might include:
 • greater individualisation (less adherence to 
collective moral and ethical ‘norms’)
 • greater complexity of processes and systems 
(it becoming easier to disguise fraud amidst this 
complexity)
 • more transactions being undertaken by computer 
and fewer face to face transactions (fraudsters 
feeling more distant from the victims of their 
dishonesty and are less concerned about any 
response)    
 • the increasing pace of change in business (with 
controls struggling to keep up).
5.6. The evidence demonstrates that organisations 
which have undertaken repeated exercises to 
measure losses in the same areas of expenditure, 
have reduced the losses over time. This suggests 
that organisations that know the extent of their 
fraud losses are better at reducing them.
 4 Gill, M. (2011) Fraud and Recessions: Views from Fraudsters and Fraud Managers. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 
39, 204-214.
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5.7. The global average loss rate for the entire period of 
the research (5.85%), when taken as a proportion 
of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 
2016 ($75.212 trillion or £60.76 trillion)5, equates to 
£3.55 trillion ($4.39 trillion). This is a sum more than 
two-thirds greater than the UK’s entire GDP and 
more than twice as much as the sum which Europe 
spent on healthcare in 20146. Even reducing such 
losses by 40%, which individual organisations have 
achieved, would free up more than £1.4 trillion – a 
sum greater than the GDP of 181 countries.
5.8. In the UK, applying that global average loss rate 
to GDP7 would imply total losses of £125 billion 
each year. Reducing such losses by 40% would 
free up more than £50 billion each year. This sum is 
equivalent to more than the UK government spent 
on defence or education in 2016.
5.9. Based on the evidence, it is clear that fraud and 
error losses in any organisationshould currently be 
expected to be at least 3%, probably almost 6% 
and possibly more than 10%. It would be wrong to 
go too much further in terms of predicting where in 
this range losses for an individual organisation will 
be, without some organisation-specific information 
about the strength of arrangements to protect it 
against fraud (its ‘fraud resilience’).
5.10. Crowe Clark Whitehill and the Centre for Counter 
Fraud Studies (CCFS), in parallel research, have 
developed Europe’s most comprehensive database 
of fraud resilience information, with data recorded 
concerning more than 1,200 organisations from 
almost every economic sector. By combining the 
data which underpins this report and organisation-
specific information about fraud resilience, Crowe 
Clark Whitehill and CCFS are able to predict:
 • the likely scale of losses
 • the key improvements which would reduce them 
 • the related cost of making those improvements.
5.11. Crowe Clark Whitehill and CCFS can also 
accurately measure losses or train client 
organisations to do so. The practical experience of 
Crowe Clark Whitehill specialists, combined with 
the academic rigour of CCFS researchers, provides 
an unparalleled specialist resource. 
 
You can use Crowe’s Self-Assessment Fraud 
Resilience (SAFR) tool to find out more.  
Go to https://www.croweclarkwhitehill.co.uk
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5 International Monetary Fund figures
6  World Health Organisation figures for 2014
7 International Monetary Fund figures estimate UK GDP for 2016 to be $2.65 trillion or £2.14 trillion
8 This was a confidential project undertaken by one of the authors of this report
9 UK NHS Counter Fraud and Security Management Service, 1999 – 2006 Performance Statistics 
10 U.S. Department of Education Performance and Accountability Reports 2001 – 2005
11 U.S. Department of Agriculture Performance and Accountability Reports 2002 — 2004
12 UK Department of Work and Pensions — Fraud and Error in the Benefit System April 2005 to March 2006
13 Department for Veterans Affairs – Performance and Accountability Report 2012
14 Department of Agriculture – Performance and Accountability Report 2011
15 Department of Work and Pensions – Fraud and Error in the Benefit System – 2011/2012 Estimates (Revised Edition)
5 International Monetary Fund figures
6  World Health Organisation figures for 2014
7 International Monetary Fund figures estimate UK GDP for 2016 to be $2.65 trillion or £2.14 trillion
6. Conclusion and 
recommendations
6.1. This is the fifth report in an area where, for too 
long, the accurate measurement of losses was 
considered either impossible or too difficult. It no 
longer is. In many areas loss measurement has 
become routine. Losses to fraud and error can now 
be treated as a business cost like any other, to be 
measured, managed and minimised.
6.2. It is also the case that work to measure losses is 
highly cost-effective. Efforts to reduce losses are 
helped by greater knowledge about the scale of the 
problem. The data shows that organisations which 
re-measure the same area of expenditure have 
consistently lower loss rates.  
6.3. Where losses have been measured, and the 
organisations concerned have accurate information 
about their nature and extent, there are examples, 
especially in the UK and US, where losses have 
been substantially reduced. The best examples 
over the 19 year period covered by this report 
include those below. 
 • A major mining company which reduced losses 
across its procurement expenditure by over 51% 
over a two year period8.
 • The UK’s National Health Service (the second 
largest organisation in the world) between 1999 
and 2006 where losses were reduced by up to 
60%, and by up to 40% over a shorter period9.
 • The U.S. Department of Education, which 
reduced its losses across a $12 billion grant 
programme by 35% between 2001 and 200510.
 • The U.S. Department of Agriculture, which 
reduced its losses across a $12 billion 
programme by 28% between 2002 and 200411.
 • The UK’s Department of Work and Pensions, 
which successfully reduced its losses in Income 
Support and Job Seekers Allowance by 50% 
between 1997/98 and 2005/0612.
 • The U.S. Department for Veterans Affairs which 
successfully reduced its losses across a $4 billion 
programme by more than 46% in 2010 and 201113.
 • The U.S. Department of Agriculture (again) 
successfully reduced its losses across an $8 
billion programme by more than 22%13.
 • The UK’s Department of Work and Pensions 
(again) achieved a significant reduction of more 
than 24% in losses in respect of Job Seekers 
Allowance14.
6.4. Even during the two years after the start of the 
recession in 2008, when losses generally were 
increasing rapidly, two of the organisations included 
in our research reported very significant reductions 
in their losses – one by 33% and the other by 19% 
— within a single year in each case.
6.5. Three things are clear:
 • losses to fraud and error can be measured and 
cost effectively
 • on the basis of the evidence it is likely that losses 
in any organisation and any area of expenditure 
will be at least 3%, probably near to 6% and 
possibly more than 10%
 • losses can be significantly reduced when 
accurate information about their nature and extent 
is available.
In the current economic climate, not 
to consider the financial benefits of 
making relatively painless  
reductions in losses to fraud and 
error is unwise.
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